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Abstract 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)  is the latest 
implementation of the welfare program. Different from Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, the new law allows for spending in categories other than the cash assistance 
traditionally thought of as welfare. With the new program being administered as a block grant to 
the states, the levels of spending in each category vary not only by year but also by state. In this 
paper, I summarize PRWORA spending into seven categories. I will test for a correlation 
between levels of spending on benefits and other categories and changes in the official poverty 
measure. At the end, I find that spending on childcare assistance, work supports, and tax credits 
authorized under PRWORA have a moderate effect on a state's poverty rate in the short-term. 
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Introduction 
The Census Bureau defines the Official Poverty threshold. Overall the threshold is 
defined by Consumer Price Index food allocation multiplied by three. A family is considered 
under the threshold if their income – work and capital gains – are below the set level, with two 
states, Alaska and Hawaii, receiving a higher threshold because of a higher overall cost of living. 
While the threshold differs by family size and composition as per the food allocation outlined 
above, state poverty rates are determined by the number of families that fail to meet the income 
levels for their respective types (Institute for Research on Poverty, Accessed 2017). In the United 
States, there are several programs designed to reduce poverty, including Social Security (a 
program designed to reduce poverty in seniors by giving them cash benefits), Supplemental 
Assistance to Needy Families (a program that gives food assistance), and Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF), the defined benefit program designed to reduce poverty across all 
ages. The third program listed, TANF, and its parent act, The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity and Reconciliation Act [PRWORA], is the focus of this paper. 
TANF is a program authorized under the law known formally as The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act. Signed into law on August 22, 
1996, PRWORA replaced the Aid for Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] program that 
was originally signed into law in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act. The original AFDC 
program focused primarily on giving cash assistance to needy families, widows and orphans, and 
eventually transitioned to providing some childcare assistance to all families. However, the basic 
principal remained, and it was not until the new act when spending was shifted to categories not 
typically thought of as welfare (HHS, Accessed 2017).  
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 With the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act 
turning twenty this past year, it is time to evaluate not only the effect of a shift in in program 
requirements but also a shift in spending away from traditional cash assistance that American 
Public Media's Marketplace (a public radio show) reported this summer in collaboration with the 
left-leaning center for American Progress (Clark, Esch, and Delvac 2016). While under Aid For 
Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] federal and state allocations were reserved for only 
for benefits (short-term, emergency as well as long-term cash assistance in addition to child care 
support), the new law allows for spending in any category as outlined below, resulting in a large 
shift in percentage allocations from the traditionally-thought of cash benefits and work supports 
(including childcare) towards other programs aimed at reducing poverty at the cause over the 
past 20 years. According to annual spending reports from the Department of Health and Human 
Services which administers the program, in 2015, block grant allocations authorized under 
PRWORA were spent on everything from childcare and transportation support programs to 
family reunification and Head Start, with additional transfers to state social service block grants 
and child care and development discretionary funds (Department of Health and Human Services 
2015).   
This paper hypothesizes that the differing ways states spend the money received from the 
federal government has a noticeable effect on poverty rates within each state. (Which direction 
the categories push the poverty rate I chose not to speculate). The rest of this article seeks to 
answer the question of which, if any, ways the official poverty measure is pushed. 
TANF Goals  
   While the overall goal of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program is to 
reduce poverty, the official goals are stated otherwise. Rather than being a defined benefit 
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program like AFDC, PRWORA is administered as a block grant to the states. This allows for 
shifts in spending from the prior-authorized benefits such as the defined benefits plan and 
childcare subsidies to other categories in accordance with the new priorities (defined below) as 
defined in the law.  Department of Health and Human Services Website lists four intended 
purposes for PRWORA which are stated as follows (DHS 2016). 
• Help needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes 
• Reduce the dependency of needy parents by promoting job preparation, work and marriage 
• Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies 
• Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families 
Shifts in priorities allowed for some PRWORA spending to be shifted. Under the condition of 
the block grant, states must spend at least 75% of grant funds on assistance in some form fitting 
the stated four missions (Ziliak 2015). As a result, defined benefit funds from AFDC were 
shifted to work subsidies and earned income tax credits. Child care subsidies were expanded, and 
emergency contingency funds were added as incentives to keep states' welfare spending at 1994 
levels. At the same time, time limits were implemented to encourage work and personal 
responsibility (24 months without work, and a lifetime limit of 60 months), and states were 
incentivized to reduce the number of people on the rolls, thereby cutting money from defined 
benefit programs in order to move it to other programs authorized under the law. Other areas of 
the new law focused on family promotion, including childcare, new requirements on teenage 
parents to live at home and stay in school, and still other programs tried to promote stable 
families through marriage counseling and pregnancy promotion programs. All of these changes 
led to new categories of spending that will be outlined in the data section and tested for 
effectiveness.  
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Literature Review 
History 
The first federal welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, was created 
in 1935 as part of the New Deal. Created along with the unemployment assistance and social 
security programs, the original law supported families with one biological parent missing, usual 
single mothers. This means-tested program was originally administered by the states but 
regulated by the federal government as states set benefit levels and the federal government set 
eligibility requirements. In the 1960's the law was expanded twice, first to two-parent families 
where the primary earner was unemployed and then as the tax rate for additional outside earnings 
was shifted from 100% down to 67% (Moffit 2002). After surviving several court challenges in 
the 1970's as benefit levels and eligibility requirements were tested, the next major modification 
to the law came in 1981 with the Omnibus budget bill. For the first time, states were required to 
count step-parent income towards eligibility funds, and income requirements were lowered. In 
addition, states were now allowed to apply for waivers to experiment with work expectations and 
job search programs, and the tax rate on additional earnings was raised back to the prior 100% 
level. In 1988, the waivers to experiment with work programs were expanded under the Family 
Support Act, with the federal government now supplying matching grants to the states to help 
support work support programs. In addition, the federal government now required transitional 
Medicaid and food stamps funds for families in the first 12 months transitioning off the AFDC 
(Ibid). These modifications to the original framework laid the foundation to the TANF that 
would come with the following decade.  
When PRWORA passed in 1997, the bulk of spending shifted from cash assistance to 
non-cash assistance spending, with nearly 2/3 of spending going to non-assistance by 2010. 
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While the requirements for the assistance portion, TANF, are very strict, the requirements for 
participation in the non-assistance categories can be very loose (Ziliak 2012). Especially for 
categories surrounding the two-parent family formation goal, this makes me suspect the effects 
on the poverty rates for these categories are likely to be very low, if they exist at all. 
TANF and poverty 
Ziliak found that while the work requirements and caps increased work. However, when 
Bunch, Liebertz, and Milita examined state-level data, they found that the restrictions did reduce 
TANF caseloads in the period from 1999 – 2007, a note that was lost in the recession of 2009 – 
2012. Overall however, the implementation of TANF did have some positive effect on poverty 
reduction, especially when controlling for state and time effects. However, these effects were 
minor and not statistically significant, especially when controlling for unemployment, prior 
poverty rate, unemployment, and political ideology. Education was the one suspected factor that 
did not correlate with poverty rates in any way (Bunch, Liebertz and Milita 2017). Additionally, 
when Muennig, et al (2015) examined the public health effects of TANF, they found a small 
noticeable increase in mortality rates for TANF recipients after the switch. This study also found 
that work rates were higher for able-bodied women with a small number of children, with many 
of the other mothers switching to Social Security Disability and other government benefits after 
leaving TANF, due in part to a lack of responsiveness to increased need in economic dips 
(Meunnig 2015). Overall I expect each program to have little effect in reducing the poverty rate, 
especially when controlling for state and time fixed effects. 
Categories  
While much research has been done on the effectiveness of TANF on reducing poverty, very 
little research has been done in regards to the different categories of spending that occurred in the 
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aftermath of this reform act and the effective changes of poverty. Consequently, I will now 
examine each category individually in how it relates to poverty. The categories examined include 
the effectiveness of family support programs from marriage promotion and sex education, to 
head start and work assistance, to cash assistance and earned income tax credit and similar 
programs. 
Marriage Promotion Programs 
The effectiveness of the marriage promotion programs and two-parent family promotion. 
Based on the data from the Census Bureau that shows better outcomes for children growing up 
with two married parents in the home (1997) marriage promotion programs became a key part of 
TANF, overlapping with 2 of the four stated missions as growing up in this type of family has 
been shown to reduce teen pregnancy and suicide, and increase high school graduation rates 
(Amato 2005). However, research has shown marriage promotion programs to have no clear 
effect on families, and the women and families most in need of the boost and most likely to 
receive access to these programs are the least likely to benefit from them. An article from Kristi 
Williams at Ohio State University summarizes data that show that single mothers who marry 
later in life are less likely to benefit from the marriage as in most cases they choose partners with 
few economic resources to benefit from. Additionally, the children of the parents who married 
later in life showed none of the benefits of the children who grew up with father. Rather the 
Williams study recommends trying to delay childbirth, but even this has its challenges as we will 
see in the next section (Williams 2014). The next article, Lundquist, et al. (2014) found that the 
largest and most popular program, Supporting Healthy Marriage Initiative, a workshop program 
designed to help promote healthy relationships within married couples, while showing some 
lasting effects on marriage happiness, is largely ineffective in achieving the goals of TANF. 
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There was no difference in separation rates for couples who attended the program versus those 
who didn't, and nor was there any lasting effect on child well-being 30 months on (Lundquist, et 
all 2014).  
The effectiveness of certain programs trying to delay pregnancy and childbirth is also 
questionable. In a 2005 article, a study from the Brookings institution, Abstinence-only sex 
education has been shown in several studies to be less effective than comprehensive sex 
education in preventing teenage-pregnancy, with one study showing no difference in pregnancy 
rates between those receiving abstinence-only sex education and no education whatsoever, and 
only comprehensive sexual education having any noticeable effect.  
Head Start 
Sabol and Chase-Lindsay found that while some families receiving Head start assistance 
saw notable improvements in educational attainment, those with a high school diploma or less 
saw no noticeable effect on either earnings or educational attainment compared with those with 
some college but no degree. However, the study also notes that the data is difficult to collect for 
employment (some states listed work preparation activities as work) so the evidence remains 
inconclusive (Sabol, Chase-Lindsay 2014). Overall, the evidence remains inconclusive, with 
evidence from prior years showing lasting improvement gaps, and the effects fading in studies 
from the early 2000's and uncertain long-term effects (Gibbs, Ludwig and Miller 2011).  
Work Programs, Work and Income 
Because these programs are largely run by the states, there is some variation in the types 
of programs offered in different areas, but overall outcomes remain largely the same. Bryner and 
Martin (2005) found little to no difference in employment outcomes between workers receiving 
the program help and those not receiving work supports, for each additional increase in income 
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was offset by an equivalent decrease in benefits in the four-year period studied. While a Florida 
Program showed moderate employment increase in the first two years, any benefit had quickly 
disappeared by year four. A Vermont program subsidizing employment with payments and 
without as much of a reduction in cash benefits found a largely positive effect in earnings from 
work, but as with the previous programs, this increase was offset by decreases in benefits over 
time. While combined with the time limits, the paper found an increase in work earnings (a goal 
of PRWORA), the overall incomes did not increase, due to a reduction in benefits, and families 
with young children income gains are largely limited. The study also notes a lack of evidence in 
evaluating TANF programs due to the variability of programs across the states, and a variation in 
participation requirements (Bryner and Martin 2005). A third evaluation, Autor and Housman 
(2010) evaluated Work First, a temporary job-help program had no effect on long-term 
employment outcomes, throwing into question the whole premise of these work-support 
programs (Autor and Houseman 2010). Finally, According to a 2010 study entitled Welfare to 
Work, the short-term programs that emphasized job finding were no more effective in promoting 
workforce participation and poverty exit than short-term education programs. Rather welfare and 
work were more likely to be affected by the strength of the local economy and the level of 
generosity of welfare benefits, with employed individuals being significantly more likely to 
leave the welfare rolls than their counterparts (Kim 2015).  
Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) 
This program has been shown to be effective in reducing poverty and improving 
outcomes for children receiving the benefits. The first study found a correlation of increased 
EITC payments with an increase in employment, especially in areas with outreach about the 
program and a high county employment rate (Bryner and Martin 2005). Families with older 
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children (above the age of 8) were especially likely to take advantage of the credit. However, 
these increases in employment were in some cases negated by increases in family size (Hotz et al 
2006). An additional study (Chetty, et al 2012) finds a significant (5%) increase in earnings for 
recipients of the EITC, even when controlling for neighborhood and phase-out regions. Using a 
longitudinal survey with data collected from 1979-2000, Hamad and Rekhoff (2016) found an 
overall improvement in behavioral outcomes for children of families receiving the EITC. 
Additional increases in measured behavioral outcomes were correlated with the size of the 
payments, with the children of single mothers showing the most increases.  
PRWORA and Welfare Recipients:   
Ben-Shalom, Moffit, and Scholz (2011) note that overall transfer programs reduce the 
post- cash transfer deep poverty rate (those making less than 50% of the poverty line) by 14 
points, and reduces post-benefit poverty and near poverty rates by nearly 14 points. However due 
to the change in assistance, the post-transfer deep poverty rate has been increasing between 1984 
and 2004, just as benefit spending has been declining. 
One final note regarding the effectiveness of the TANF program in particular: While 
under AFDC, the number of welfare recipients fluctuated irregularly, with population in before 
the 1960's, and then with the different modifications afterwards, overall benefit levels have 
dropped since the 1980's and cannot explain the fluctuations in spending (Moffit 2002). And 
while the number of adults receiving benefits has dropped, the number of families in which 
children are the only beneficiaries of welfare payments (something not constrained by lifetime 
caps) has increased four-fold in the period from 1990-2013, putting numbers back to the 1960's 
composition of 75% children. Additionally, while the number of total cases of assistance are 
tracked, the non-assistance caseloads have not been tracked, making the true impact of 
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PRWORA difficult to calculate (Ziliak 2015). Especially in accordance with the time limits 
Mazzolari (2007) found that the caseloads dropped the closer people got to their time limits, and 
that they had a very real effect on TANF recipients, especially when accounting for the personal 
characteristics.  
Data 
The primary source of the data is the website of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, which has data on first AFDC spending and then TANF spending by category for every 
year since 1962, when AFDC was first passed. This is the source for all numbers related to 
TANF allocations by category. Control data comes from the Center for Poverty Research at the 
University of Kentucky. 
Categories  
The data is analyzed based on the following categories. As the original dataset contained 
dozens of categories, the ones listed below are my condensation of dozens of datasets into a 
manageable list, loosely based off the categories in the original documents. 
From the Prior Law (AFDC); Assistance and Administration 
• Benefits and Emergency Assistance 
• Childcare 
• administration 
• Jobs and Work Support (including transportation) 
New Categories from TANF Spending  
• Child welfare and home visits, 
• Family maintenance programs, including out-of-wedlock and two-parent family 
promotion programs 
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• Other Child welfare programs, including Head Start, After School Programs, Domestic 
Violence and Substance Abuse programs,  
• Refundable tax credits (EITC and related state programs) 
• Other transfers, including Social Services Block Grant, Childcare discretionary, and 
transitional services for the unemployed 
• Other – everything else, including Foster care, Juvenile Justice, both assistance and non-
assistance 
Final categories: 
• Benefits and Emergency Assistance 
• Childcare 
• Jobs and Work Support 
• Administration 
• Tax Credits 
• Family maintenance  
• Transfers to other programs 
• Other  
Benefits and emergency assistance - this is what people typically think of when they think of 
TANF or welfare. This includes any and all direct transfer payments to individuals and families. 
However, unlike the prior law, under TANF proof of work or educational activity is required, 
and the program, while mainly federally funded, is administered by the states, with differing time 
limits and work requirements. In general, an individual cannot receive benefits from the program 
for greater than 60 months as a lifetime cap as well as emergency assistance – this category 
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includes temporary, non-recurrent benefits, typically reserved for emergency situations. This 
category is a carry-over from the prior law, AFDC. 
Childcare – these are subsidies given to individuals to help pay for childcare and thus enable 
them to work and support themselves. At this point, before I have completed the analysis, I 
predict the effect to be quite large.  
Jobs and work supports – this category includes everything from subsidized work programs 
to education and transportation to and from work. This category is especially important because 
one of the stated goals of TANF is to promote work as a way out of poverty.  
Family Maintenance – this was one of the most surprising categories of spending. In this 
case, funds are spent on two-parent family promotion and pregnancy prevention, including, in 
some states, abstinence-only sex education. Included also in this category are family 
maintenance programs. Under AFDC, states were required to spend part of their funds on 
programs that promoted child welfare such as foster care and home visits to promote child safety. 
This is the one category of spending that satisfies not one but three of TANF's stated missions. 
Administration - these costs are related to implementation of the program and are capped at 
15% of total funding.  
Transfers to Other Programs - Current law allows up to 30% of federal TANF allocations to 
be transferred to the Social Service Block Grant and Child Care and Development Fund. Because 
they are not TANF-related programs, they merit their own category. According to the 
Administration for Children and Families, in 2014, states spent the allocations for the Social 
services block grant on everything from foster care and child protective services to adult daycare 
and family planning services (ACF 2015). The Child Care and Development Fund [CCDF] is 
15 
 
more directly related to the stated goals of PRWORA in that it subsidizes child care as well as 
state agencies that enable the enforcement of laws surrounding it.  
Other - this category includes everything else, from the other category (as defined by HHS) 
to systems to juvenile justice payments and the Individual Development accounts. This category 
is the one into which all the leftover categories are thrown into.  
Control variables:  
These variables are ones I'm using to control for. These include time effects (denoted by 
year) and state effects. These also include state populations, unemployment rates, fraction of 
state house and senate that are Democratic, gross state product, state average personal income, 
and state and federal minimum wage levels. Each of these variables is expected to account for 
some part of the poverty rate, with the state effects controlling for variables like racial 
composition and education levels, and time effects controlling for recessionary periods. 
Unemployment is directly related to poverty, with poverty defined as a lack of a minimum 
income and unemployment defined as lacking a job or means to make an income, and minimum 
wage directly relates to income of the poorest Americans. Gross state product and state personal 
income are two variables that measure the strength of the states' economies, and Democratic 
governing numbers control for the differing levels of other social programs.  
Hypothesis 
Based on my prior research, I have formulated a hypothesis that concerning the 
respective test variables. I believe that benefit spending will have a minimal effect on the poverty 
rate because benefits are not counted in the official definition of poverty and because one cash 
transfer could be income that fulfills a need of the recipient.  
Additionally, I suspect work supports, earned income tax credit, and child care to have 
the largest impacts on reducing poverty because those are the programs that theoretically enable 
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work and work and income. The programs that I suspect to have no to positive effects on the 
poverty rate are the administration, family maintenance, and transfers because those have not 
been directly linked to poverty reductions. Additionally, I expect the state and unemployment 
control variables to have the most significant effect on poverty rates. 
Modeling  
The next thing I did was do a basic regression of my test variables, excluding the controls. The 
model reads as follows: 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
 𝛽2 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽3 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽4 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽5 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 +
 𝛽6 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 +  𝛽7 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽8 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
The second model utilized the same model as above, but added in the control variables: 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽2 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽3 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +
 𝛽4 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽5 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 +  𝛽6 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 +
 𝛽7 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽8 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽9 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 +
 𝛽10 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽11 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +
 𝛽12 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +  𝛽13 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
 𝛽14 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽15 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 +
 𝛽16 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽17 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒  +
 𝛽18 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽19 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
 𝛽20 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽21 𝑊𝐼𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
 𝛽22 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
The final two models included all prior variables but adds in controls for state and year, 
to control for factors like recessions, and other state effects. Note that they are two variations on 
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the same model, but utilize two different commands on STATA and control for state and time 
effects in similar ways. These models read as follows:  
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽2 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽3 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 
+  𝛽4 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽5 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 
+  𝛽6 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 +  𝛽7 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽8 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
+  𝛽9 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 +  𝛽10 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 
+  𝛽11 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  𝛽12 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐹 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
+  𝛽13 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +  𝛽14 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 
+  𝛽15 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 
+  𝛽16 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽17 𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒  
+  𝛽18 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽19 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
+  𝛽20 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽21 𝑊𝐼𝐶 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
+  𝛽22 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 +  𝛽23 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
+  𝛽24 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
Results 
This section details my results. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
In the first regression, I tested all my categories against the poverty rate. Initially the only 
categories showing anything close to a significance level were the Other and the Transfers to 
Other Programs categories. The Other category showed coefficient value of .0437 and a t-value 
of 4.44. The transfers category showed a coefficient of -.056 and a t-score of -2.73 The other 
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categories showed p-values ranging from .23 to .91, showing no statistical significance at this 
level.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The second regression I ran included my control variables from unemployment to the number of 
recipients for the various social programs. In this regression, the other category was no longer 
statistically significant with a new t-statistic of 1.69. The transfers to other programs category 
remained statistically significant, but the t-statistic dropped to -1.85 from the prior high of 2.79. 
Notable other categories with t-statistics with absolute values above 3 include unemployment, 
total state income, number of Medicaid, food stamps, and SSI recipients; state and federal 
minimum wages, and if the governor was a democrat (this surprisingly had a t-statistic of –3.44). 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
In this regression, I controlled for state and year fixed effects, in addition to the rest of my 
control variables. Insignificant categories again included Assistance, Administration, and Other, 
along with Family Maintenance; however the rest of the test categories showed some level of 
significance. Jobs and Work Assistance came in with a coefficient of .007, an error of .003, and a 
p-value of .03. Tax Credits had a coefficient of .01, an error of .004, and a p-value of .02, with 
the Childcare category having a coefficient of -.005, an error of .002, and a p-value of .05. The 
final significant category was Transfers to Other Programs, with a coefficient of -.023, an error 
of .01, and a p-value of .02. Significant control variables included Unemployment, Party of the 
State's Governor, the Federal Minimum Wage, and the Number of Food Stamps Recipients.  
Analysis and Conclusions 
Overall, when all variables are accounted for, the categories of spending from PRWORA 
act have some significant effects. Jobs and work support programs came in with an expected 
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level of significance but the coefficient showed a .007 increase in the poverty rate for the given 
state and year which was not predicted. However this makes sense, as an individual partaking in 
a job training program is less likely to be working and therefore earning income as he pursues his 
studies. However since the combined category is so complex, including everything from job 
training to subsidized work to transportation subsidies, more research is needed to determine 
which of the subcategories has the effect of increasing the poverty rate. Additionally, this paper 
only addresses the short-term effects on poverty of the spending categories, and this program 
may have effects stretching out beyond the scope covered.  
The Tax Credit category also had a level of statistical significance that I had somewhat 
predicted. With a coefficient of -.01, this showed for each increase of the spending on the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and similar tax credit programs, the poverty rate dropped, especially when 
controlling for state and year effects. This does make sense, as tax credit programs reward 
families and individuals for working by giving a refund if an individual works but earns income 
below the poverty level. By giving a refund in amounts to the difference between the individual’s 
earning and the poverty level for their family size, it makes sense that this program has a direct 
impact on poverty.  
The Child Care category was the third category that showed a level of statistical 
significance when controlling for state and time effects. With a coefficient of -.005, this was the 
third category I had expected to have an effect on the state’s poverty rate in the short-term. 
Childcare itself is a major expense for mothers, and if a mother is not earning enough to cover 
the expense of caring for young children, it makes no financial sense for her to go back to work 
and push herself over the official poverty measure.  
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The most surprisingly significant category was that the Transfers to Other Programs 
Category, with a coefficient of -.023. This was unexpected, as I had not seen prior research into 
the effects of general social service spending having a significant negative effect on poverty. (A 
majority of spending transfers went directly to the Social Services Block Grant.) This is a place 
where I would recommend additional research as my model failed to explain the why of this 
effect.  
The control variable prediction was the prediction that was closest to the actual outcome, 
with the unemployment rate and the federal minimum wage having large significant effects on 
the poverty rate, and the state effects also differing by various amounts. The unemployment rate 
effects were to be expected as the rate to which a population lacks jobs and income has a direct 
impact on the poverty rate (lack of income). The federal minimum wage also most directly affect 
workers on the lower end of the income spectrum, and has a significant effect on their earnings 
Additional variables that I didn’t expect to be statistically significant but were include whether or 
not the governor of the state was a Democrat, the number of food stamps recipients, and the total 
personal income, all of which were controlled for on the state level. These were in fact 
surprising, but make sense since Democrats tend to favor more generous social programs, since 
food stamps allow for spending in other categories on the individual level, and a higher total 
personal income in a state can be thought of as inversely related to poverty. 
Block grant and spending 
 The biggest change to the welfare programs in the shift from AFDC to PRWORA was 
from a defined benefit program administered by the federal government to a block grant 
administered by the states. This allowed a shift in benefit spending, from a total of nearly 12 
million dollars in 1980, (seventeen years prior to the implementation of PRWORA) to 9.5 
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million dollars in 2002 (five years post PRWORA) to 7.8 million dollars in 2015 (the most 
recent data available) (HHS 2005, OFA 2015). This may alone may cause changes in the 
effectiveness of the programs, due to lack of uniformity between programs among the states, and 
is another area where more research may be needed.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, variations in spending through the PRWORA have some noticeable effects 
on state poverty rates in the short-term, with spending on childcare, tax credits, and jobs and 
work supports, all having t-statistics well above the 95% confidence interval. While this model 
calls into question the effectiveness of spending on certain categories, namely family 
maintenance programs and the non-categorized programs in the other category, overall the model 
supports much existing spending in reducing poverty, at least in the short term.  
Options for future research include a comparison of overall dollar for dollar spending on 
TANF when compared to WIC, Food Stamps, and unemployment benefits to see which has any 
level of effectiveness on reducing poverty rate, as well as additional work into why the programs 
work as well as they do. Additionally, some more long-term analysis may be called for as certain 
programs like Family Maintenance may take some time to show an effect. An additional 
question would be to check the effectiveness on the spending of the test categories against the 
supplemental poverty rate, which includes benefits and transfer payments. But as for now, there 
can be some conclusive proof that in the short-run spending on tax credits, work assistance, and 
childcare under PRWORA cause some reduction on state poverty rates in the short run.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Regression 1 
Number of obs   =       
966 
F(8, 957)       =      4.87 
Prob > F        =    0.0000 
 
 
Root MSE    =    3.3716 
Poverty Rate Coefficient Standard Error T P>|t|      
[95% Conf. 
Interval] * 
Benefits and Assistance 0.0007788 0.0073792 0.11 0.916 -0.014 0.015 
Other 0.0436868 0.0098327 4.44 0 0.024 0.063 
Administration 0.0705946 0.0578754 1.22 0.223 -0.043 0.184 
Transfers to Other 
Programs -0.0556266 0.0203418 -2.73 0.006 -0.096 -0.016 
Jobs and Work Support -0.0112011 0.0102886 -1.09 0.277 -0.031 0.009 
Family Maintenance 0.0171239 0.0223906 0.76 0.445 -0.027 0.061 
Childcare -0.0018354 0.0070419 -0.26 0.794 -0.016 0.012 
Tax credits -0.0119001 0.0113343 -1.05 0.294 -0.034 0.010 
Constraints 12.40573 0.1279437 96.96 0 12.155 12.657 
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Table 2 
Regression 2 
Number of obs   =       
923 
F(23, 899)      =     59.57 
Prob > F        =    0.0000 
 
 
Poverty Rate Coefficient Standard Error T P>|t|      
[95% Conf. 
Interval] * 
Benefits and Assistance -0.010 0.006 -1.53 0.125 -0.022 0.003 
Other -0.009 0.008 -1.12 0.263 -0.024 0.007 
Administration -0.039 0.042 -0.92 0.357 -0.121 0.044 
Transfers to Other 
Programs -0.031 0.017 -1.85 0.065 -0.064 0.002 
Jobs and Work Support 0.003 0.007 0.4 0.692 -0.012 0.017 
Family Maintenance 0.009 0.016 0.56 0.574 -0.023 0.041 
Childcare -0.008 0.005 -1.61 0.107 -0.018 0.002 
Tax credits 0.000 0.008 -0.02 0.983 -0.017 0.016 
Unemployment Rate 0.451 0.054 8.340 0.000 0.345 0.558 
Federal Minimum Wage 0.614 0.144 4.270 0.000 0.332 0.896 
Total Personal Income -0.217 0.049 -4.440 0.000 -0.312 
-
0.121 
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Table 3 
Regression 3 
Number of obs   =       
923 
F(23,48)          =      61.46 
Prob > F        =    0.0000 
Number of groups  =   
49 
 
Poverty Rate Coefficient Standard Error T P>|t|      
[95% Conf. 
Interval] * 
Benefits and Assistance -0.004 0.003 
-
1.380 0.175 -0.010 0.002 
Other -0.004 0.005 
-
0.660 0.511 0.014 0.007 
Administration 0.035 0.245 1.410 0.166 -0.015 0.084 
Transfers to Other 
Programs -0.023 0.010 
-
2.340 0.023 -0.043 -0.003 
Jobs and Work Support 0.007 0.003 2.320 0.030 0.001 0.013 
Family Maintenance -0.005 0.008 
-
0.610 0.548 -0.022 0.012 
Childcare -0.005 0.002 
-
2.000 0.052 -0.010 0.000 
Tax credits -0.010 0.004 
-
2.440 0.019 -0.018 -0.002 
Unemployment Rate 0.373 0.053 6.990 0.000 0.265 0.480 
Federal Minimum Wage 0.429 0.154 2.790 0.008 0.120 0.738 
No. Food Stamps Recip. 0.020 0.003 5.970 0.000 0.013 0.027 
Governor Democrat?  -0.410 0.157 
-
2.610 0.012 -0.727 -0.094 
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